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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
The Global Commission on Internet Governance (GCIG) was established in January 2014 to articulate 
and advance a strategic vision for the future of Internet governance. In recent deliberations, the 
Commission discussed the potential for a damaging erosion of trust in the absence of a broad 
social agreement on norms for digital privacy and security. The Commission considers that, for 
the Internet to remain a global engine of social and economic progress that reflects the world’s 
cultural diversity, confidence must be restored in the Internet because trust is eroding. The Internet 
should be open, freely available to all, secure and safe. The Commission thus agrees that all 
stakeholders must collaborate together to adopt norms for responsible behaviour on the Internet. 
On the occasion of the April 2015 Global Conference on Cyberspace meeting in The Hague, the 
Commission calls on the global community to build a new social compact between citizens and 
their elected representatives, the judiciary, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, business, 
civil society and the Internet technical community, with the goal of restoring trust and enhancing 
confidence in the Internet.
It is now essential that governments, collaborating with all other stakeholders, take steps to build 
confidence that the right to privacy of all people is respected on the Internet. It is essential at the 
same time to ensure the rule of law is upheld. The two goals are not exclusive; indeed, they are 
mutually reinforcing. Individuals and businesses must be protected both from the misuse of the 
Internet by terrorists, cyber criminal groups and the overreach of governments and businesses that 
collect and use private data. 
A social compact must be built on a shared commitment by all stakeholders in developed and less-
developed countries to take concrete action in their own jurisdictions to build trust and confidence 
in the Internet. A commitment to the concept of collaborative security and to privacy must replace 
lengthy and over-politicized negotiations and conferences. 
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The following are the core elements that the Commission advocates in building the new social 
compact:
• Fundamental human rights, including privacy and personal data protection, must be protected 
online. Threats to these core human rights should be addressed by governments and other 
stakeholders acting both within their own jurisdiction and in cooperation.
• Interception of communications, collection, analysis and use of data over the Internet by 
law enforcement and government intelligence agencies should be for purposes that are 
openly specified in advance, authorized by law (including international human rights law) 
and consistent with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Purposes such as gaining 
political advantage or exercising repression are not legitimate.
• In particular, laws should be publicly accessible, clear, precise, comprehensive and non-
discriminatory, openly arrived at and transparent to individuals and businesses. Robust, 
independent mechanisms should be in place to ensure accountability and respect for rights. 
Abuses should be amenable to appropriate redress, with access to an effective remedy 
provided to individuals whose right to privacy has been violated by unlawful or arbitrary 
surveillance.
• Businesses or other organizations that transmit and store data using the Internet must assume 
greater responsibility to safeguard that data from illegal intrusion, damage or destruction. 
Users of paid or so-called “free services” provided on the Internet should know about, and 
have some choice over, the full range of commercial use on how their data will be deployed, 
without being excluded from the use of software or services customary for participation in 
the information age. Such businesses should also demonstrate accountability and provide 
redress in the case of a security breach.
• There is a need to reverse the erosion of trust in the Internet brought about by the non-
transparent market in collecting, centralizing, integrating and analyzing enormous quantities 
of private information about individuals and enterprises — a kind of private surveillance in 
the service of “big data,” often under the guise of offering a free service. 
• Consistent with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, communications 
should be inherently considered private between the intended parties, regardless of 
communications technology.  The role of government should be to strengthen the technology 
upon which the Internet depends and its use, not to weaken it.
• Governments should not create or require third parties to create “back doors” to access 
data that would have the effect of weakening the security of the Internet. Efforts by the 
Internet technical community to incorporate privacy-enhancing solutions in the standards 
and protocols of the Internet, including end-to-end encryption of data in transit and at rest, 
should be encouraged.
• Governments, working in collaboration with technologists, businesses and civil society, must 
help educate their publics in good cyber-security practices. They must also collaborate to 
enhance the training and development of the software workforce globally, to encourage 
creation of more secure and stable networks around the world.
• The transborder nature of many significant forms of cyber intrusion curtails the ability of the 
target state to interdict, investigate and prosecute the individuals or organizations responsible 
for that intrusion. States should coordinate responses and provide mutual assistance in order 
to curtail threats, to limit damage and to deter future attacks. 
This statement provides the Commission’s view of the issues at stake and describes in greater detail 
the core elements that are essential to achieving a social compact for digital privacy and security.
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Introduction: The Opportunities and 
Risks Emerging from the Internet
In a short period of time, the Internet has become enmeshed in our daily lives. Now, people 
can exchange text, voice, images and data of all kinds — from anywhere in the world, instantly. 
We can create content, interact digitally, shop internationally with ease, exchange knowledge and 
ideas, and work together globally. The Internet, as a network of networks, is already capable of 
communicating and storing almost unimaginable volumes of data online, including data that can be 
associated with each of us individually and can be used for good or for ill. 
In developed economies, the Internet has already delivered substantial social and economic benefits 
and is now an essential vehicle for innovation. For the developing world, the Internet can represent 
a powerful medium for social progress and economic growth, lifting millions of people out of 
poverty. For those struggling against repressive regimes, it represents a window into the wider 
world, a voice and a means to mobilize resistance and support. For those wishing to spread violent 
and hateful ideologies, it represents an unparalleled opportunity to try to radicalize new audiences. 
For those seeking criminal gains, it represents a way of conducting traditional crimes on a larger 
scale and conducting new forms of Internet-enabled crime. 
It is important to recognize that the communications and data of all of these actors are mixed together 
in the packet-switched networks and data clouds of the Internet. They all use the same fixed and, 
increasingly, mobile devices operating with the same Internet protocols. For the authorities charged 
with tracking down terrorists, countries that conduct espionage, cyber vandals and criminals of all 
kinds, the Internet provides a reservoir of information about their targets. But at the same time, the 
ability to access the intermingled data raises concerns over personal privacy and data protection. 
All developed economies now have multiple Internet dependencies. As the global reliance on 
the Internet rises, the vulnerability to disruption increases. Although Internet access is far from 
universal, by 2020 the number of Internet users is expected to reach five billion, with each user 
capable of interacting with any other. The largest portion of this further growth will be in the 
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developing economies. The opportunities to collect, retain and use data for commercial profit, for 
harm and criminal gain, and for intelligence and security purposes, will increase commensurately. 
All stakeholders’ capacity to protect fundamental human rights and to respond effectively will need 
to keep pace.
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Public Concern over Hacking of  
Personal Accounts
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Financial Cybercrime
Data source: CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust. Available at www.cigionline.org/
internet-survey.
Note: The CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey was conducted between October 7, 2014, and November 12, 2014. 
Twenty-four countries were polled, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, South 
Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States. In total, 23,326 Internet users were 
polled, aged 18–64 in Canada and the United States, aged 16–64 in every other country.
This shift in the availability of personal, commercial and public sector information, and the potential 
for access to infrastructure and control systems, represents a new source of vulnerability for society, 
magnified by the growing use of mobile devices and wireless networks that offer additional ways 
for networks to be penetrated. 
These dangers will be accentuated by the advent of the “Internet of Things” that is already starting 
to connect the key objects and instruments of daily life — our cars, our homes, our appliances, our 
clothing and much more. In the emerging world of the Internet of Things, everything we do, see, 
use or touch will leave electronic tracks, enlarging further both the potential commercial and social 
value of such data. It also will expand the opportunities provided for police and intelligence agencies 
to learn more about their suspects. Important questions still have to be addressed concerning the 
vulnerability of such connected systems and the privacy implications of allowing state and private-
sector actors to have access to and to share the big data that they will generate. Similarly, there will 
be a need to clarify that whatever access there is must have a legal basis.
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Data Breaches Affecting over 10 Million
Data source: Business Insider. Available at: www.businessinsider.com/data-breaches-infographic-2014-12.
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Individuals, Businesses and 
Governments Face New Challenges
This data revolution has significant and complex negative implications for three sets of actors: 
individuals, businesses and governments.
A number of surveys indicate that, for individual and corporate users of the Internet, the primary 
concern is to have adequate assurance of the security of their information against misuse: the 
cybercrime, vandalism, theft and even terrorist acts that the Internet enables. Not all individuals 
understand the full scope of what they have placed online deliberately or what information has 
been captured and stored by others as they go about their daily activities. Nor do most individuals 
know to what commercial use their data are deployed. 
Internet Users’ Concern over Private Company Monitoring of Online Activity  
and Sale of User-generated Data
74%
Very/Somewhat 
concerned
26%
Not very/Not at all 
concerned
Data source: CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust. Available at www.cigionline.org/
internet-survey.
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Third parties who have access to data have the potential to monitor, obtain and put to use enormous 
quantities of private information about individuals and businesses, their communications, their 
plans, their locations and behaviour, even their shopping, viewing and reading habits. These 
developments and increasing awareness of them pose a substantial challenge to safety and security, 
to privacy rights and to citizens’ trust in the Internet, which has steadily been eroding. Therefore, 
these developments are also a substantial threat to the social and economic value of the Internet. 
Today, some companies exceed governments in their capacity to collect, store in centralized 
repositories, integrate, analyze and make use of personal data. These companies are increasingly 
attractive targets for cyber intrusion, and susceptible to efforts to jeopardize the confidentiality, 
availability and integrity of these large data pools. These companies have to demonstrate to their 
users a high level of respect for, and protection of, the security and privacy of their information. At 
the same time, companies must exhibit corporate social responsibility in responding to government 
requests for access to their users’ data. They also must contend with increasing requests for access 
to data from law enforcement overseas due to the transborder nature of many activities taking place 
on the Internet.
Many companies operating on the Internet also are building their businesses on the use and sale 
of the data they gather. Often the data are accessed in exchange for providing a free service to 
their users. Data collected from customers are often used for purposes not explicitly revealed to 
those who provide the data, and used without their permission. On one hand, this is fuelling data 
analytics to the benefit of innovation. On the other, it raises concerns about the respect for users’ 
privacy. There is a rising call for regulators, or for the industry itself, to establish standards for 
transparency and accountability mechanisms to increase confidence in the marketplace.
Governments have the responsibility to pursue Internet policies that are consistent with fundamental 
human rights and the rule of law, and that promote economic well-being. At the same time, they 
have a duty to address threats from both state and so-called “non-state actors” such as dictators, 
insurgents, terrorists and other criminals of all kinds. As data and communications of all types 
moved from traditional telephone and radio technologies to Internet-based transmission, the 
opportunities for intelligence agencies to monitor such targets by intercepting and exploiting 
digital data increased. Yet it is difficult for law enforcement officials to interdict and prosecute 
transnational criminal activity without having assistance from secret intelligence agencies and their 
powerful tools of digital intelligence gathering. For example, the pattern and content of messages 
sent between al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or other terrorist 
operatives, and those between members of transnational criminal organizations, would be a 
high priority for interception by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of many nations. 
Cooperation may be required to share specialized resources, because a great deal of criminal and 
socially damaging activity takes place in the deep recesses of the Internet, including the so-called 
“dark web.” Oversight is required to assure citizens that their rights are not infringed upon in the 
pursuit of a range of bad actors.
Government activities themselves are vulnerable to terrorists and cyber criminals through the 
Internet. Many governments are seeking to work with businesses to improve national cyber 
security to counter the risks of cybercrime, disruption and destruction, especially of critical national 
infrastructure. These increased risks underscore the importance of governments monitoring threats 
and attacks online. Nevertheless, some governments are conducting both targeted and mass 
surveillance in ways that have a chilling effect on fundamental human rights and, in particular, 
freedom of expression and legitimate dissent and protest, and threatens the realization of the 
Internet’s economic and social benefits. 
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National and International Responses
The speed of these contradictory developments in the use of the Internet has left policy lagging 
behind. Governments struggle to know how to manage the harms the Internet facilitates while 
preserving its power for good. 
At a domestic level, responding to pressure from privacy and civil liberties organizations, in 
several nations a debate has started about the nature, capacity and legal framework of their digital 
intelligence activities. Some Internet and telecommunications companies now publish transparency 
reports about the demands governments place on them. Some nations already have comprehensive 
legislation to regulate intrusive digital intelligence powers; others do not. Some have parliamentary 
or judicial oversight (or both) of such activity while some do not have either. Personal data protection 
regulations are mostly not yet suited to the complexity of the digital age — for example, by not 
adequately regulating the extensive secondary use of personal data or ensuring the transparency of 
exceptions to privacy for sovereignty and national security purposes. The military utility of offensive 
cyber operations and intelligence attacks is increasingly recognized, as are the dangers posed by 
advanced malware and software flaws. 
Public Concern over Domestic State Surveillance
61%
Very/Somewhat 
concerned
Not very/Not at all 
concerned
39%
Data source: CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust. Available at www.cigionline.org/
internet-survey.
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National and International Responses
At the international level, all states have subscribed to the UN Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, and almost all states have ratified the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
both of which enshrine the right to privacy in international human rights law. Additionally, some 
groups of states have usefully developed the right to privacy further, such as in the Convention on 
Human Rights from the Council of Europe and by implementing the judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, both the NETmundial outcome document and the two 
recently adopted resolutions from UN General Assembly on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age 
affirmed that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, including the 
right to privacy. 
Public Concern with Foreign Government Surveillance
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Very/Somewhat 
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Not very/Not at all 
concerned
38%
Data source: CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust. Available at www.cigionline.org/
internet-survey.
The obligation of states to protect and promote rights to privacy and freedom of expression are not 
optional. Even if they are not absolute rights, limitations to these rights, even those based on national 
security concerns, must be prescribed by law, guaranteeing that exceptions are both necessary and 
proportionate. Governments should guarantee the same human rights protection to all individuals 
within their borders. Clearly, any interference with the right to privacy should not be arbitrary or 
unlawful, bearing in mind what is reasonable to the pursuance of legitimate aims. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Privacy Guidelines state that exceptions to 
its principles, including those relating to national sovereignty, national security and public policy 
(ordre public), should be as few as possible, and made known to the public. The 2013 International 
Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, developed at the 
initiative of civil society, are an important reference regarding how international human rights law 
should apply in the current digital environment. States are called to comply with the following 
principles: legality, legitimate aim, necessity, adequacy, proportionality, competent judicial authority, 
due process, user notification, transparency, public oversight, integrity of communications and 
systems, safeguards for international cooperation, safeguards against illegitimate access and the 
right to effective remedy.
Formal and informal efforts such as these are early steps in the emergence of a new social compact 
for the digital age.
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Core Elements of a Social Compact 
for a Digital Society 
There must be a mutual understanding between citizens and their state that the state takes 
responsibility to keep its citizens safe and secure under the law while, in turn, citizens agree to 
empower the authorities to carry out that mission, under a clear, accessible legal framework that 
includes sufficient safeguards and checks and balances against abuses. Business must be assured 
that the state respects the confidentiality of its data and they must, in turn, provide their customers 
the assurance that their data is not misused. There is an urgent need to achieve consensus on a social 
compact for the digital age in all countries. Just how urgent is shown by current levels of concern 
over allegations of intrusive state-sponsored activities ranging from weakening of encryption to 
large-scale criminal activity, to digital surveillance, to misuse of personal data and even to damaging 
cyber attacks and disruption. 
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Online Behavioural Change in Response to Edward Snowden’s Revelations
Data source: CIGI-Ipsos Survey on Internet Security and Trust, available at www.cigionline.org/internet-
survey and World Bank Indicators on Population and Internet Penetration Rates, available at  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
In an environment of rapidly changing technologies and social attitudes, a normative approach 
would be a practical starting point for such an effort. Key elements of a social compact for the 
digital age will necessarily take different institutional and legal forms in different societies and 
cultures. Nevertheless, a global social compact should be informed by a number of core elements:
• Fundamental human rights, including privacy and personal data protection, must be protected 
online. Threats to these core human rights should be addressed by governments and other 
stakeholders acting both within their own jurisdiction and in cooperation.
• Interception of communications, collection, analysis and use of data over the Internet by 
law enforcement and government intelligence agencies should be for purposes that are 
openly specified in advance, authorized by law (including international human rights law) 
and consistent with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Purposes such as gaining 
political advantage or exercising repression are not legitimate.
• In particular, laws should be publicly accessible, clear, precise, comprehensive and non-
discriminatory, openly arrived at and transparent to individuals and businesses. Robust, 
independent mechanisms should be in place to ensure accountability and respect for rights. 
Abuses should be amenable to appropriate redress, with access to an effective remedy provided 
to individuals whose right to privacy has been violated by unlawful or arbitrary surveillance.
• Businesses or other organizations that transmit and store data using the Internet must assume 
greater responsibility to safeguard that data from illegal intrusion, damage or destruction. 
Users of paid or so-called “free services” provided on the Internet should know about, and 
have some choice over, the full range of commercial use on how their data will be deployed, 
without being excluded from the use of software or services customary for participation in the 
information age. Such businesses should also demonstrate accountability and provide redress 
in the case of a security breach.
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• There is a need to reverse the erosion of trust in the Internet brought about by the non-
transparent market in collecting, centralizing, integrating and analyzing enormous quantities 
of private information about individuals and enterprises — a kind of private surveillance in 
the service of “big data,” often under the guise of offering a free service. 
• Consistent with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, communications 
should be inherently considered private between the intended parties, regardless of 
communications technology.  The role of government should be to strengthen the technology 
upon which the Internet depends and its use, not to weaken it.
• Governments should not create or require third parties to create “back doors” to access 
data that would have the effect of weakening the security of the Internet. Efforts by the 
Internet technical community to incorporate privacy-enhancing solutions in the standards and 
protocols of the Internet, including end-to-end encryption of data in transit and at rest, should 
be encouraged.
• Governments, working in collaboration with technologists, businesses and civil society, must 
help educate their publics in good cyber-security practices. They must also collaborate to 
enhance the training and development of the software workforce globally, to encourage 
creation of more secure and stable networks around the world.
• The transborder nature of many significant forms of cyber intrusion curtails the ability of the 
target state to interdict, investigate and prosecute the individuals or organizations responsible 
for that intrusion. States should coordinate responses and provide mutual assistance in order 
to curtail threats, to limit damage and to deter future attacks. 
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Moving toward a Social Compact 
for a Digital Society
The social compact for a digital society will require a very high level of agreement among 
governments, private corporations, individuals and the technical community. Governments can 
provide leadership, but cannot alone define the content of the social compact. Achieving agreement 
and acceptance will necessitate the engagement of all stakeholders in the Internet ecosystem. 
At first, it is unlikely that a universal social compact suitable to all circumstances could, or even 
should, be the immediate goal. The Internet is used and valued across all cultures and all borders. 
Significant changes of attitude can sometimes evolve more quickly and more flexibly than could 
be possible through negotiated treaties or international legal instruments. In the fullness of time, 
national approaches may gain recognition as good international practices, and may eventually 
acquire the status of customary international law. But that is many years away, and the speed of 
technological change argues for flexibility and innovative solutions. The area of secret intelligence 
is especially difficult to regulate since there is little international law governing it, but even that 
largely secret domain ought not to be free of ethical and legal considerations.
The social compact will contribute to building a new kind of “collaborative privacy and security.” 
The term highlights a fundamental truth about the Internet: every part of the Internet ecosystem 
affects every other part. Thus, the new social compact is not about “balancing” human rights and 
privacy against states’ interests or against commercial rights.  It is about ensuring that a framework 
exists where each actor has the responsibility to act not only in their own interest, but also in the 
interest of the Internet ecosystem as a whole. By definition, the process should result in outcomes 
that are win-win rather than zero-sum games. Effective security, successful business models and 
human rights are mutually reinforcing in the long run. All interests must recognize and act on their 
responsibility for security and privacy on the Internet in collaboration with all others, or no one is 
successful.
14 Centre for International Governance Innovation • Chatham House
Toward a Social Compact for Digital Privacy and Security
The Public’s Preference for Multi-stakeholder Governance
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Data source: CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust. Available at www.cigionline.org/
internet-survey.
In the end, it is in the interest of all stakeholders that the Internet remains trusted as a common 
global resource: open, affordable, unfettered and available to all as a safe medium for further 
innovation. Government, business and civil society must work together toward that aim.
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Conclusion
Conclusion
These recommendations are put forward by the Global Commission on Internet Governance to 
encourage a strong consensus among all stakeholders that the benefits of the Internet for humankind 
must not be put at risk, whether by disproportionate state behaviour in cyberspace, by criminal 
activity or by business activity undermining assurance in the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information on the Internet. Advancing a new normative framework, which accounts for the 
dynamic interplay between national security interests and the needs of law enforcement, while 
preserving the economic and social value of the Internet, is an important first step to achieving 
long-term digital trust. The Commission is committed to building on this statement by continuing 
its program of research and publication, undertaken in collaboration with partners from all sectors.
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